市场评论

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下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。

0 N- h1 r/ u) u8 R+ \Market Commentary
, y$ s; _% }9 h' b& }! @8 kEric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
+ z& Y) U- h3 e- n/ HJames Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
Signature Global Advisors
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1 A+ {3 ^3 k. n$ yBackground remarks
 Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
" J$ r2 j6 U5 h4 c1 a% Tas much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
 Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
adjustments.
% R0 B$ B0 \/ ?3 |5 D This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
# V' A, |7 x( B! H4 |safety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
* c2 T) l9 H; M* t* r. x, V Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
lessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
 We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
adjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
quantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
* r* p4 ~, C  `$ n7 ~2 k/ k# z Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
 Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
reduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
( i! a% k- I% V( x The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
8 z6 \0 }" P5 {as funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
impose liquidation values.
. o0 w% o! J) z, |* k In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
5 v4 P% ?# e1 ^) QAugust, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
$ J4 e; L" M1 v$ E! s The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
9 ?( y# r& o" H8 lscrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.

A look at credit markets
 Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
1 x3 ^; u2 \2 ]* ~3 x5 y0 O0 I High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
8 D6 V: i% M( s; Z) _) z" P. Vthen, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
4 z2 z7 N: z  i( F2 y( T9 O0 _: @billion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
9 l! J- g/ I) L4 M" F8 aaccess to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
9 O6 R" t; C+ A2 i* tpositive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
 Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
finding financing.
/ g9 q* F9 V6 s4 H+ y" \ Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
3 |4 j; z' `) C$ B$ [ Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
is now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
/ [4 S( j7 W! egoing up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
bankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
 European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
3 j  s! ?# _* m+ |8 {3 mtoday.
2 Z" l$ f) _, D- o Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
 Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
the Greek default.
 As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
debt stabilization, needs government approvals.
/ ~1 n, e8 h* w  {0 p6 x. _3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
banks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
- V! W7 T$ W6 u  t! c4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

Beyond Greece
8 E: g% V* N; N3 o The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
 It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
  Y8 E( L) ?% }. w1 J# i It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.

Conclusion
) n+ x/ w5 X% @% R$ I We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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