市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。
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8 |; \1 x3 I+ `+ F0 o7 D2 qMarket Commentary
Eric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
6 [, Q7 R% h* _James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
Signature Global Advisors


8 `( b9 I9 a& J  ?7 wBackground remarks
1 A7 T. z$ C: W: n/ N$ D Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
; g* p" H" X% J' g4 c7 K( d$ B7 Xas much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
 Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
  }' z8 w3 {2 G7 I" i7 E+ j( jadjustments.
 This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
safety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
 Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
2 D$ |+ Z+ {* y2 \* R5 x9 Y8 ~8 \lessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
' M& I8 P( ]: H  Y1 \4 k+ s  z We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
$ `6 M& B# w% `, [adjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
quantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
 Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
3 ^0 }6 A' c: C3 \' B8 G Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
reduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
 The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
$ h$ D; w1 q* S/ Uas funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
! r  J6 ]$ P, Z8 e6 C% H( Gimpose liquidation values.
 In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
8 _3 k8 H7 b1 J& X, MAugust, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
 The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
2 n7 A+ H6 U1 W" b+ ^* @6 Xscrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.
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  |1 t8 \6 K/ [) X. zA look at credit markets
4 ?# q, z% C) Y4 R2 p; u9 y Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
' Z; m  X# @4 r" b0 L/ bSeptember. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
 High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
billion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
positive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
 Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
finding financing.
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
6 T  B& W( k$ \ Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
is now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
4 l) v1 v2 ^4 c5 {5 Agoing up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
bankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
 European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
today.
# T( n" z8 s! X. | Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
 Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
  ~: n3 x- j/ g! r( zthe Greek default.
+ N. B8 ]" }& r4 d, W As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
# q* X' s, V% X5 _9 ^2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
debt stabilization, needs government approvals.
+ g: ]4 f6 {! |. [% j/ L, c3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
banks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
$ N; k" f; n" \# p4 t4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

. v; r/ n  f$ k3 G3 P% R6 cBeyond Greece
; A, V- B+ G, X; b; U The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
 It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
+ t7 D$ K  m% k# F It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.

7 L2 A8 O0 g+ v5 i- @: vConclusion
- z6 `5 {! Q& \' _ We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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