市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。
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" j' T& @# y" u$ p$ i( [Market Commentary
, L5 q+ P/ B3 Z- |Eric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
Signature Global Advisors
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Background remarks
 Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
4 w  c( ?' k/ X! y) Aas much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
 Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
$ d5 ~1 N" q+ hadjustments.
 This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
& p) r* k( L# ~. q# X2 \safety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
8 G. l) z# Y2 I* r4 L Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
' p! N. ^+ S8 ^8 E0 q* hlessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
: ~! N5 ~2 e5 j7 I; }2 [ We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
adjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
; E; }" b4 s0 p& u4 s4 l$ pquantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
9 n9 l* T9 N1 c Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
$ a! D( s! T7 s Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
2 i0 h5 h1 ~. P+ a  r6 Qreduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
 The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
as funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
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0 _" Q* q6 E' `" n In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
* W7 H0 t0 {3 t1 @$ a  \5 AAugust, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
% T& ?; u' U- N# B9 B The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
; G1 ]% M; w8 }$ y( K2 Rscrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.
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6 h/ b  {5 ?. c9 U. M) Q7 nA look at credit markets
# n  V8 B- v6 G4 k5 } Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
/ M; m" `' x7 s0 t3 eSeptember. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
 High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
* W6 d. P& ?; _* ^' q. P6 \$ N, jbillion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
( A9 Q2 a8 q, @+ Z8 _access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
positive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
+ S2 o9 d" }8 [4 w Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
finding financing.
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
 Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
( b9 J  y) I+ o$ ]* s2 A. |* b6 J/ Qis now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
& O, L( o$ `3 W: \. ]; ?$ rgoing up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
bankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
1 {& h) w! ^" m& z European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
today.
 Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
" o2 L0 Z1 p' R4 `emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
 Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
8 u* _* v9 S; k) r6 Xthe Greek default.
2 [* q6 |: V. }( x7 F" r+ s As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
debt stabilization, needs government approvals.
! m6 X+ s" C* F: H9 T3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
banks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

Beyond Greece
 The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
 It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
5 u7 ]8 @( m2 C' C2 f It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
/ [2 \0 m: ]. W! aItalian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.
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 We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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