市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。
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Market Commentary
# N4 C! E! v  x( {% bEric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
0 _% {5 F+ a! u  VJames Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
3 T4 f: U: G3 C) HSignature Global Advisors

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Background remarks
3 f8 @" W* b( v Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
as much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
. c- d$ O# n8 c: z' ~ Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
  f% C# {9 Z7 j, xadjustments.
 This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
+ F, \+ o' l" p: N( hsafety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
+ N$ o+ D' W3 j2 C3 K- \+ l Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
0 A4 ?6 R8 V8 ~4 h) l+ Hlessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
 We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
' i6 Q6 X6 _/ A* G9 _7 Z# s8 Q# n: Gadjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
* P- ]; g8 p/ O3 [ Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
9 t- M: C, F* N# }  ?4 e2 Fquantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
3 W) O2 \: [3 E1 T5 w( } Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
  s' O+ E2 a6 u# \ Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
reduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
& Z# q: p0 k, h The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
8 k4 K2 W% R/ c' gas funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
: K: z# y- {! X4 |impose liquidation values.
2 K) n& {2 E  t1 ~. Y7 B' x& I In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
August, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
 The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
- K/ Q0 o" A" K$ A4 R% I7 L/ q, Dscrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.
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A look at credit markets
! ^5 i/ h) x8 N5 i Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
 High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
0 ]' n$ z( k9 w2 q" g0 Mthen, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
billion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
positive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
 Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
finding financing.
" R) `0 S" F0 N6 ?8 V* v  I Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
 Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
$ T: b; e( z' `9 Q3 ^4 m1 {is now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
3 B1 g) p/ \$ \: w, agoing up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
bankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
 European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
2 w4 V* U. m; N: Q. Dtoday.
; @1 g. T, t# a7 C) A Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
 Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
. o0 D' _; |( S" V5 {. c2 cthe Greek default.
 As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
6 t, \/ E4 v0 D5 M9 v4 V2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
debt stabilization, needs government approvals.
4 l- A. s  ]( j9 x! o& v- h3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
banks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

3 C# f1 K+ K- Q+ ]( nBeyond Greece
 The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
- \0 r0 _9 f8 q$ Abut that was before Italy.
 It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
 It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.
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/ Y; q) L, U8 h( ?5 vConclusion
- c5 W: U& d- ^1 s We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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