市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。

Market Commentary
# ?7 y' Z2 P' }$ t# _) N5 j8 N4 M8 AEric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
4 V4 b) C& k/ ISignature Global Advisors
0 ]5 w, z- t  H: e3 k

Background remarks
$ M* N6 R$ I) W0 B Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
as much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
( Q5 p7 J3 {- v) C Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
1 Y) G7 J. b* z- e, L9 \adjustments.
; D4 a$ _. t  y, p- z This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
safety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
 Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
lessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
 We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
, i- x3 O5 V! |, @" hadjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
8 v- l% B: D) \9 z. n) j8 F+ v Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
% q* E  {6 u3 f& C* Y* }1 hquantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
6 A. b7 T, }6 S+ d/ J" r  @/ \ Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
& h3 E0 G1 a( S, O. s* \ Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
8 f" I8 f! c9 _5 N( Ureduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
, ]9 N! a9 n3 Q The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
! g# H. C+ S" ]6 B8 f, f0 r( Has funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
5 ~& n: [# {2 p6 s/ cimpose liquidation values.
! y# v3 `( z' _  y8 P9 Y$ W In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
# x& y7 S9 h: M0 IAugust, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
 The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
scrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.

6 H% {* P. }! P& M0 MA look at credit markets
  ?* {" Y8 b: S" G, K% Z2 w# c Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
/ T+ W: z) [1 ?; }' |. ZSeptember. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
% s( Q" ~0 T) t High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
% D0 c% D7 l9 z  i1 O" S( w9 N  jbillion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
3 |. H% k5 k5 i/ L1 uaccess to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
; n' f1 T0 \/ O  E$ TCCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
* s2 Z$ u$ Q* {8 [1 Z! F/ Wpositive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
 Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
finding financing.
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
 Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
) K& j4 [' M, {8 J# X) T2 Lis now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
6 g/ q5 @" A6 o5 egoing up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
bankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
 European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
today.
# }9 c3 ~0 |% h9 f8 k9 ?0 e  U Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
 Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
the Greek default.
 As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
+ ^' S" v# s& V& u' P1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
debt stabilization, needs government approvals.
+ i$ X( W- f: X, h  |0 g* d3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
banks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
9 V! Q$ Q- {0 Y) h  C! \& g4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.
* k4 t8 B0 z( E7 \* v/ {/ ]! S
Beyond Greece
 The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
 It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
3 c: W/ O( f) k* a* m8 Z It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
2 n2 |/ ~! J) F* r  X5 BItalian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.

Conclusion
* ^* l) F! X/ L6 @4 e6 P% f" { We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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