市场评论

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下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。
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3 B/ w/ `7 U9 p9 CMarket Commentary
6 {7 W1 k2 K/ s8 W4 TEric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
8 q: U+ h$ O" y% X0 Z/ YJames Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
Signature Global Advisors

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Background remarks
 Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
as much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
7 `9 c" v6 M( i Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
' f. m9 R# I8 m9 zadjustments.
 This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
safety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
 Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
- A; K' B3 \3 Mlessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
 We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
) ~5 Z' D7 }) e$ G$ K5 x" F; E' tadjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
* }! `" L, s+ ?" E/ Fquantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
 Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
* a" j8 a5 Z; w1 s+ B Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
reduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
& f: z- O$ L' X2 n" V; C The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
7 X2 q" r! O# J* ras funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
impose liquidation values.
 In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
+ a3 X# o1 N1 Z% ~  Q# dAugust, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
 The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
scrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.

  ]. f' n' y% `( b6 EA look at credit markets
$ r4 O. _. y) f! z% X Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
. W  g( x2 J1 v/ @/ U5 j4 N4 [September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
  B2 P  J# b3 J  F High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
billion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
9 n+ X/ F0 ]" }) \/ daccess to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
% K& N' n6 S6 Hpositive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
 Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
finding financing.
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
3 c/ |7 f2 ?& _1 B6 _. M# `, O Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
is now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
9 n' X. Q7 L$ t; o: x: M( Dgoing up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
bankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
 European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
today.
 Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
 Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
the Greek default.
 As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
6 i5 L; [+ F" ]+ t2 w, ^3 Z" X& w1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
1 i4 a9 L0 \; Z3 fdebt stabilization, needs government approvals.
3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
banks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
: n" l  I0 \+ S% }. ^' b2 {4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.
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Beyond Greece
) |5 H) F' m/ R7 l. F: v  N6 e The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
" W+ Y3 T/ k) V1 A! dbut that was before Italy.
* {+ K! V4 a1 L0 T! B: p It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
 It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.
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8 M& x+ A7 b+ d; dConclusion
 We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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