市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。
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% s% ]( `8 }6 i( C. J+ S& X3 g- xMarket Commentary
! G- P/ s2 |* v$ C& u% yEric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
2 P0 x% L7 D2 p/ `' d& xSignature Global Advisors

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, e& u+ d/ A  y' q& NBackground remarks
1 Q, Z5 }8 I5 G2 v2 i) F Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
as much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
 Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
6 i* p9 Z3 W" ?% [' j+ H6 Cadjustments.
3 ^6 F' |/ e$ q# t This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
safety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
 Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
lessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
 We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
adjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
9 q4 V- H2 Z  |# D0 |2 J Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
* a2 @" h" A( xquantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
0 ~2 ^& }7 h/ B4 l+ ?/ T Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
 Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
reduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
 The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
+ S0 L2 V) t2 o; i; O$ was funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
/ a- V5 I3 Y! T! l5 ximpose liquidation values.
$ v. l& j% r0 r2 l5 Y( z7 p In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
August, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
 The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
3 `& o1 U/ \7 z" ^' b$ |. `  [scrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.

, w0 U; t. e8 y& lA look at credit markets
 Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
" @* F+ M8 u5 C( B1 ]3 |4 M0 MSeptember. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
 High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
( g! w& n) S0 t0 x6 xbillion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
' }+ y4 p, E, n  d8 P4 y* @! F+ Xaccess to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
positive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
2 l' G/ M* r! @: T) F Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
* W. c: }7 `2 ?% ^3 b2 q: tfinding financing.
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
 Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
is now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
; t3 F* f5 e2 f3 M) l  fgoing up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
0 u+ F; t+ a( t% ?' F. ybankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
, ^6 e1 b2 {  B/ a/ Q5 ^0 e( n European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
9 L  p$ ~2 H. r0 ktoday.
 Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
" m$ V- [/ U3 o' p$ f% W' remerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
" p* ]$ l* V9 K2 c# Y Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
. @* R/ Z4 p5 `the Greek default.
 As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
debt stabilization, needs government approvals.
- {/ [5 h4 \: z/ s( y3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
banks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

Beyond Greece
/ b6 p' _7 b7 ^7 }5 t( X, c; p The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
8 }. ^$ j3 Q# n) K: x7 Abut that was before Italy.
+ Z8 E: y- i6 |3 O It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
 It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.
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Conclusion
 We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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