市场评论

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下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。
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" t, o% e( ~) ~3 w) XMarket Commentary
Eric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
Signature Global Advisors

7 |9 ~7 T* w% R" D/ y
9 g1 z5 Q$ Z* d4 y# BBackground remarks
! Z0 m% {/ T2 @5 q' H* p Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
as much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
 Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
adjustments.
' `3 Z: N0 d% Y, {0 _ This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
* k! ~; @5 }; i/ b3 f: B/ ksafety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
 Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
lessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
 We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
! Z9 H2 i) Z5 L) e& S8 wadjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
9 ^; b$ _# l- w/ v+ E: Oquantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
 Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
; ]7 a! M1 x; u4 H Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
0 y  c% |. A+ H5 c4 Qreduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
 The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
$ K' C3 V2 M+ ^as funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
impose liquidation values.
- P/ d9 Y. g$ h$ x, v% f In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
: G+ b0 o5 N2 W. K: }7 NAugust, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
 The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
# s: ^2 T* a6 Mscrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.

A look at credit markets
3 p: s4 M' }2 {& c' q Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
$ \1 K$ g' t- B* `9 B0 O2 [* o High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
8 {" ]5 o) E% p5 \  o# `billion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
! ^( I1 g' M% h7 W! _access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
. ?6 W. |* ]1 r" `( j2 dpositive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
 Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
finding financing.
) G- }9 _" [5 z& w Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
) P5 I, J$ `$ y3 C) X$ U  z) l1 e9 ]were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
2 K, j+ x4 W+ |* ] Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
& n8 ]9 I  y( l' {4 s, _is now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
( s! a; C/ n2 b, O  y4 }7 K$ ?going up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
0 i% X( r; D- d9 _3 e, @bankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
 European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
today.
/ l4 W0 o' w, z; ? Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
" @( b+ `" I3 h7 S Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
3 a; I2 T6 V2 i+ Bthe Greek default.
 As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
5 O! w9 `) h( l4 m  E- ^1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
- j" a4 N, O/ A7 E2 k& edebt stabilization, needs government approvals.
3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
0 \; c; q% O$ b6 [3 l- Obanks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

& o7 J0 E. M/ _; D$ @4 i# jBeyond Greece
$ k. _/ j% |3 K3 o  z The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
: @$ F( L4 I. _+ V It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
 It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.

Conclusion
8 K$ B7 j6 C* M  Y We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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