市场评论

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下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。

6 U2 f, Y* Z+ s. \Market Commentary
Eric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
Signature Global Advisors
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Background remarks
 Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
as much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
) ~% \) t: a3 H" V, j0 X1 }& f Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
) U$ F: \+ c# k. a: g1 gadjustments.
4 a" E& r8 j5 X& Z/ R& V This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
1 U) t4 N  p4 c9 Osafety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
 Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
- R' c* `* N3 qlessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
6 L& j! v5 n) J2 }$ f2 D We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
adjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
3 ?# Z- d/ m5 U  M4 M Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
7 Q" c+ D( ^! V2 d3 j4 \+ A( T# @6 |quantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
  P: F' U2 `% w& ` Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
2 A6 a1 ^6 Q( J& b' |* M Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
; U- N: B! V7 s' I5 ]8 s8 }, [reduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
 The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
7 @( S. U6 J! das funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
impose liquidation values.
 In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
- A  `2 X, H! V  U% `! O: a" k( AAugust, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
 The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
( a1 {' W* K; ]1 \scrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.

: s3 M9 }1 E2 L6 r/ L# W8 zA look at credit markets
 Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
$ v' \  m# r& X$ e6 z) R6 Q2 `6 O High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
billion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
! P0 E5 Y! L& P5 C0 Hpositive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
9 a3 p& D$ {  p4 k% [  w Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
9 U) g% H( G7 _; n0 J$ _# x: Gfinding financing.
8 o- k, `, r2 ]& z+ l Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
. r7 B1 B" @6 K Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
is now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
going up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
$ x4 t6 e' i9 F+ y- `, Wbankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
/ |( l; z+ }2 I# H( Y European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
today.
 Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
: B3 p' X& u4 k* \. e* v- Cemerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
' {' Q) D( _- |$ D& n8 s+ X Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
the Greek default.
 As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
' b5 F2 w# T) S" ^+ ?1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
debt stabilization, needs government approvals.
: g# Q9 F' G# p3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
0 N6 {; J( i& t; j7 j# e6 Pbanks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
& b, q, J8 r/ r% l4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.
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Beyond Greece
, }3 U. H+ r6 c/ Z' h) o9 q The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
 It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
# B6 w& b% t+ r It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.
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Conclusion
 We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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