市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。
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/ W% \( m0 g' z% k/ `: e7 n# jMarket Commentary
1 Z: R) ]" b8 M) y0 j+ `% R' V3 HEric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
2 {7 q' C3 y  W* l4 a) ]. ^2 L: kSignature Global Advisors


Background remarks
5 D) o+ M3 O$ l& `8 z+ f8 L0 v  R Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
as much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
  Q: E& t, V0 f: N Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
adjustments.
" w- Q  Y* K; [* M This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
safety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
3 R1 s2 i. b' F7 W) V Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
( l9 V' P7 A/ rlessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
8 B6 S* U- y+ I We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
adjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
quantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
 Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
) j3 e3 [1 E3 ^/ {! J8 d Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
reduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
3 E0 \* ?% C3 m The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
1 M- J! c+ R  F& L" f9 q" Vas funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
& V3 N5 _- v- D! g8 kimpose liquidation values.
4 j7 {* ?+ c( C* |1 ^1 ~' |3 C In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
5 q8 Q, P6 t/ F. t& o0 mAugust, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
3 q2 @4 L* Z/ C4 J8 I The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
scrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.
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5 X8 l, @8 z. p3 ]4 H  Q( lA look at credit markets
 Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
 High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
# r4 }' \# N9 e$ fthen, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
billion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
8 f5 N! u& ~! RCCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
positive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
 Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
finding financing.
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
 Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
2 K( U4 ?7 M9 C" kis now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
going up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
bankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
 European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
" Q* H/ x# @' X- O4 Vtoday.
$ F4 A# L! [; y1 C" U Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
2 O# h+ y9 Q1 m4 m2 D Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
the Greek default.
8 ^. ?$ U; x# |5 g! w1 V As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
3 [3 d" m$ v, [, |# n1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
debt stabilization, needs government approvals.
  E' R( Z( i6 o3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
/ r& D/ g, o8 ?( rbanks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
; {# [; o4 H9 G' T: {! {4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

/ p% M( X, @8 e" w: s8 v# IBeyond Greece
3 y/ C; P' s# A. a0 S The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
 It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
 It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.

3 Y0 s5 b) M" E3 N; \Conclusion
 We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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