市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。

$ L! K( d1 ]* E; i( |( ^Market Commentary
Eric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
8 }+ R) o; R& @James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
Signature Global Advisors

- r+ n: A# O0 g' T( k
Background remarks
  W0 F+ G* ?+ _  E Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
) |$ v+ _8 h; J% A  Kas much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
# w/ E1 X/ n; B. e/ e Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
adjustments.
8 `! j" h, n9 ?; y" O8 n4 | This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
3 e4 G; E3 G" W6 s  a$ q% Jsafety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
$ E. f5 a" J8 v" |3 Y/ h6 W Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
lessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
2 k* T: ~% }. ^ We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
adjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
quantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
 Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
 Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
reduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
5 a2 x( H1 F7 P( l8 ] The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
as funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
; ?6 o3 ~, d9 u6 |- Yimpose liquidation values.
! L2 r1 f9 ]' |5 ^ In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
August, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
$ z' G! Q" O: J The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
scrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.

A look at credit markets
$ M2 C/ b* c9 ^& ~! | Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
 High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
2 k1 R8 N% ]3 q% i$ ]9 D) }- v/ O4 @then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
7 ]  B) o( w( k" j0 V7 U$ abillion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
3 j1 Z, \8 M: r+ R8 q5 j0 Zaccess to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
positive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
, A9 B2 S* M9 T) {* A5 x3 k0 G Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
finding financing.
6 }; @* @2 {+ ^6 ~5 l Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
% m$ O5 i$ x( Y. [5 ?9 E4 hwere subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
 Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
& Y% {5 c' i, f  o% ^* Z, Iis now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
) A9 `& h5 z1 `6 @going up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
) u+ A. g) m+ f* Ebankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
 European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
today.
" J9 s; N9 y0 {) ~6 C. k2 R8 A Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
" r) ^; w3 V$ O9 X5 V1 @emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
 Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
the Greek default.
 As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
) i  y: O3 N$ f5 Cdebt stabilization, needs government approvals.
3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
banks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
, L8 i2 [! k; [/ e( b4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

  [5 X6 U) D7 B# h/ \9 I. wBeyond Greece
 The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
* O/ g3 `& j$ [4 _but that was before Italy.
 It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
+ S' }7 \1 f% b. _ It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
9 Z- b( Y7 R3 C: pItalian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.

Conclusion
/ }5 Q1 C6 G. z; _  b/ o% \ We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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