市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。

Market Commentary
Eric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
Signature Global Advisors
7 t8 a0 c$ z' [5 Z

; ^) P- v# F. K6 B7 wBackground remarks
' e; v$ v7 e2 [ Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
9 T; M8 L% T9 m2 U% xas much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
 Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
adjustments.
, w& D6 t* \# u( m This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
* m( V. j1 O, [8 i' K5 ]8 Vsafety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
 Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
lessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
 We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
3 ]" T- k  |* q! hadjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
7 m, f& m, ]- E5 c  ^" x5 y Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
quantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
, l. F6 f1 \& C) `/ }5 k# B Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
; G- e/ t; {( W Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
reduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
- ?& B1 b# e7 Q/ R0 ~4 L The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
as funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
# h; L/ M# A8 X; Q$ cimpose liquidation values.
8 [" n: m) t' h: I# z In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
August, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
 The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
3 e+ S1 a. x1 V( i4 y0 Bscrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.

A look at credit markets
6 q3 H! N) P2 M: i4 H2 \. a Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
 High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
billion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
2 U+ U) a$ ^. z( k# Kaccess to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
positive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
 Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
7 p7 d' e4 y# A  U* w) y% Z1 Z& vfinding financing.
, z9 u% \8 d& L. D Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
1 _* H# v1 V6 `- ^" ~% \, u% Ewere subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
7 h8 S. O0 c/ l) v5 C Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
is now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
6 U8 F  c# W) o6 Hgoing up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
' h/ ^4 t8 d% R  u4 l1 ?bankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
 European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
  M) H8 k3 d0 T& ctoday.
9 e( Z# ]) @$ p7 I4 z Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
' d0 g- z" I* W. v5 }1 p Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
the Greek default.
 As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
" [. ], \+ u: `% e. E& i2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
/ L4 W& C  g, T. c  @/ |debt stabilization, needs government approvals.
3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
banks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
# |. W, r1 ?# G8 V3 X6 c4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

Beyond Greece
  A9 S9 I) D# }, U The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
6 e4 X3 F7 K+ _1 ~/ N It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
8 G# _1 ^5 r3 |  {2 O" ]4 q It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
7 I6 u9 q! _+ r( M$ U) t3 U; QItalian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.

7 _/ X: v  n' T: w  {Conclusion
  N) P9 W/ M6 R- D7 ~ We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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