市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。
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# ]7 L7 M$ ]- E# w; V8 bMarket Commentary
Eric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
" l9 U# z6 u9 dSignature Global Advisors
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  O% x7 E" n& n4 RBackground remarks
 Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
as much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
7 v6 d$ m5 w! @ Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
adjustments.
) z7 b- O  F( E! E! F' `! o& z This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
  X3 J) r$ L- \/ M# Usafety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
' q7 U! x7 Z* [0 ?/ \' h5 p8 }, M Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
lessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
8 ~6 H7 m+ j/ f4 e9 Z) m We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
adjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
; S6 a* o) b6 h3 K9 ~, u' F2 Dquantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
2 o) M) }4 ^, C Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
7 x1 h1 s/ B& C( g# F Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
$ w* c/ d/ k9 y1 Ireduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
2 n) ]# ?8 q0 c4 \2 ?0 n The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
as funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
. }+ O6 r8 y' @impose liquidation values.
! R4 w, r' F3 @; } In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
August, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
 The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
2 Y5 u0 s$ e, D! D: s( s- }3 uscrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.

2 O0 [- c/ I& DA look at credit markets
 Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
 High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
billion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
" Z; e' K4 E1 G9 Caccess to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
positive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
 Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
. y! N' [2 {/ @- n8 g9 S& kfinding financing.
/ x8 h' f' Y* U2 L' o  l- f0 `$ X Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
+ v" Q+ o( |) I  S6 m& m1 O Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
$ F! X4 ^- Z1 \+ B- |is now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
+ G0 E4 a% g  A$ B( |0 b6 Zgoing up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
5 ^( ~. p! z2 k) t, Wbankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
% f0 u1 L* e# \6 N% ] European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
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; m2 M$ s% h, g3 q7 W' J/ } Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
' K; t% V5 q0 B+ k% a1 bemerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
 Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
( u4 r" x  h2 W) Y) `the Greek default.
8 n# @) }% A  e; i' W! W! q As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
; v9 l: n; R  d  P/ ]! T  D2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
debt stabilization, needs government approvals.
  _3 x4 r4 f4 E0 y/ C3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
banks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

$ g3 D/ u, C) X8 B1 h1 k$ hBeyond Greece
 The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
- C- m$ t" A$ V5 X: Tbut that was before Italy.
) N- R% ~6 |' Q7 _ It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
 It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
6 I* _8 I: K6 r6 JItalian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.

6 G  K1 d8 ]# }. x* Q4 EConclusion
 We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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