市场评论

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下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。

$ y# z3 O5 v- k' m  M; tMarket Commentary
Eric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
& ?$ S5 }1 `/ L) z1 _3 H" [1 aJames Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
Signature Global Advisors

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Background remarks
 Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
as much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
 Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
adjustments.
 This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
2 a4 z7 ~- d& \2 rsafety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
  u+ u$ N  ^- T# w- ^" G9 e% G) U Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
lessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
! Y7 k' v8 i+ q9 g3 H We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
adjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
9 X2 L1 `! C1 {$ F# X' F: e+ F2 Pquantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
* O1 p/ g, U- U% I Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
) U: H2 D' @7 h% }4 `) {+ j Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
6 r- y6 A+ Q" }% M8 breduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
: J1 N/ A- ^. `  M% T! w  s% K The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
as funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
% l+ Q8 ^; A. J2 Jimpose liquidation values.
 In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
+ W0 a& Z2 @1 `4 AAugust, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
 The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
scrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.
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A look at credit markets
+ M( k" M4 d+ k+ ^ Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
% G1 |* c, [6 m: C4 d4 h' e1 sSeptember. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
. B' `8 v2 L8 x8 k0 [$ X0 ~ High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
billion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
1 ~- E- e  R- t7 g% taccess to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
2 @' o. N3 k5 CCCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
positive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
, Q. V. G4 M8 g; y# v Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
3 Z" |0 Z! o5 W4 u7 `finding financing.
9 n6 ?2 A; R' V/ R( x7 Q9 _3 d Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
; H) ^+ W, t4 C. Xwere subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
 Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
is now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
+ z5 g) _2 y0 K2 q$ vgoing up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
& L0 l$ Z2 e8 C: j5 T% jbankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
 European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
( k1 V$ a0 b+ B3 R/ B! `3 otoday.
 Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
5 \# t* p. W6 D9 \' Uemerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
 Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
the Greek default.
; L8 _% r) f0 O& u0 m As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
debt stabilization, needs government approvals.
, x4 J) I1 D" o% g! k. ?3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
banks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.
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Beyond Greece
 The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
 It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
 It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
. N" n# e8 X0 ]1 m! i; vItalian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.

Conclusion
 We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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