市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。
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/ x( T) t* G7 R/ r5 A! k; HMarket Commentary
: e: G4 [8 a: xEric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
Signature Global Advisors
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. D; ]2 V0 ]1 v$ i# \Background remarks
$ i( H3 O- ~" G9 \8 ?- A Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
# Q% A) r' H) V6 x: ]: ]as much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
 Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
adjustments.
 This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
9 w+ P8 c6 O3 r" ~safety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
8 G8 q9 e8 m$ J, w: l# v0 f0 m; G Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
lessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
 We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
% c# q; ]* B, }0 K6 k, Q# U5 cadjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
quantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
 Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
) ?/ L: {( E6 Z- C Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
reduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
 The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
; e( q2 e1 |/ c0 d4 v- R) cas funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
impose liquidation values.
 In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
, j+ h4 W3 q! ~) V# |6 r# yAugust, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
 The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
scrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.
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A look at credit markets
 Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
 High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
9 P% M5 s' r9 ~; }5 N( k  n8 }then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
  K2 S* Q! h9 s# Jbillion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
! B7 y. B9 ^4 L& vCCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
9 K% ^" T% l" {7 E; z; D- R) [positive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
4 Y0 ^! L  n4 W4 q0 ? Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
finding financing.
: S, @9 Q; j' N+ t Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
' A: O" p# @$ D+ D( O! {were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
# J1 l( K( u' `; k- R Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
- V1 i* h' }0 j0 I. ]is now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
' ^4 c* F1 U* ?going up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
bankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
% R7 G! f" T$ w) S European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
today.
+ }9 X! g6 T; _+ }0 G Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
, x% Y+ o- j2 C7 F0 |( c* M; P- l; c; ` Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
) {. l0 [: T7 _" W7 Tthe Greek default.
 As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
4 N* M" d- n3 Q" b! \; I* e  f% D7 z1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
+ t5 w0 J  ^, k2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
9 Z. [3 K4 V) I5 k5 a/ Edebt stabilization, needs government approvals.
3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
banks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
5 N/ J5 v# @0 b( U. P6 V4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.
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/ n! _* @* f) L6 d8 FBeyond Greece
3 k- y  n: [/ x- t5 g% c The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
 It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
3 m  Z- X/ ~4 ^) J- Z0 n" ~1 k# x It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.

Conclusion
 We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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