市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。
1 \9 _6 L- n+ U$ O8 ?. I9 E
9 }0 Q  j. K& t* A* o2 k& W* oMarket Commentary
4 }8 n+ j* R" QEric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
+ w# J8 u- f7 K+ w5 T2 W5 _) B+ ?James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
) e& j/ o! U5 O6 ^  D" t7 e4 ESignature Global Advisors
$ J/ T1 Y! G7 p' e2 H; P6 K

) |& ^( n& H% m5 c$ o: @4 A8 q% BBackground remarks
6 h. h' S8 J- T Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
as much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
7 ]1 h. x; U2 _& y* M Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
adjustments.
 This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
% F# [4 o2 H( Isafety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
 Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
lessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
 We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
6 }; c) {; g+ Badjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
quantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
- s/ B. o4 m6 @6 G5 p7 g8 M  _" x Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
1 E* T) d, z+ Q3 w3 {" | Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
reduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
# Z4 n" }4 j& A; K1 [1 A$ g* F" E The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
as funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
4 q# ~% U  i3 R( @' x( Nimpose liquidation values.
 In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
August, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
8 _( I0 ~8 }$ m! h  W The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
" d8 l& D- J) wscrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.
7 S! @# @! N3 g% p) ~
7 R# C+ k6 g( g5 G7 K/ U! G& nA look at credit markets
 Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
 High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
3 m: O6 y. H% ybillion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
* `* `& }; x/ a4 I0 Qpositive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
 Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
finding financing.
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
 Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
is now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
) N$ r  T; ?, a0 g  T% R0 Hgoing up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
bankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
 European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
# c) q' q1 H- v, v3 qtoday.
 Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
 Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
the Greek default.
! Q( N# G( l2 g( u( L$ \ As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
8 o6 k' T8 w' s1 |1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
9 E( p5 Z  k$ |# Y0 ^debt stabilization, needs government approvals.
) Q2 v9 f. {2 N! m$ m3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
* N: `2 `4 V2 c' n, l4 zbanks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
8 F, W9 [9 k. P+ Y) \$ g( W8 S, U4 Y4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

1 p+ w2 L" h& s% O5 WBeyond Greece
 The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
0 ]6 _, h- R' I* k/ h0 _' ybut that was before Italy.
3 w) a; y9 d3 N* Y" k6 [ It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
 It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.

: [; w3 `$ {; O2 n8 YConclusion
 We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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