市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。
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  S0 q$ o3 w; I* v; U/ U. xMarket Commentary
Eric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
% f$ ^6 H* `& K# V: pJames Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
0 K! W2 ]8 i' s, VSignature Global Advisors
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Background remarks
 Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
as much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
' Q+ s4 r& x/ }, ?+ l- h Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
& {  ?/ I+ j5 X0 [+ ^2 h. vadjustments.
1 P7 a: g( E& N+ R7 g8 P: M2 T This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
1 E& V% A' k1 D" ^safety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
5 c7 y; i/ y% Y; B7 \) h Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
lessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
/ \# P- v; v( d, \ We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
adjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
: d4 Q; o5 I2 U Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
$ z9 X2 v* _$ oquantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
 Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
% m- H9 y0 G8 g, D Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
reduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
' y* E$ e+ h( ]" ?) h, [; r1 a9 Y The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
$ L5 [( w' o" i' kas funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
impose liquidation values.
 In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
4 F6 R6 i. G" y3 P; JAugust, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
 The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
) Y% d; [$ q4 ?( Lscrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.
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5 O) j8 |; D, AA look at credit markets
 Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
$ ]3 B, u8 e; @  h4 u5 O+ pSeptember. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
 High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
billion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
) {2 i4 z) @( c0 faccess to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
* {4 H, j& F# ?8 hpositive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
7 q4 L* n5 A7 g: E, ]% R: i Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
finding financing.
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
1 a* V( N) y+ Uwere subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
 Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
is now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
' q6 V+ n( d, D- M& o7 A! v: wgoing up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
bankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
 European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
7 s  V. r* W" _% ^today.
; ~1 a( ^- v9 B$ j Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
7 G8 ~0 v3 O7 ]2 remerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
% m& ]2 {3 m' s: ^* e Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
the Greek default.
 As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
debt stabilization, needs government approvals.
6 [# _* }) j% q( i7 z$ H3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
/ V0 g0 C5 c! B2 D5 Mbanks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

: g# H6 q4 b2 |+ kBeyond Greece
; \& K4 j& o& `; O The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
 It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
0 f% G2 `8 W2 F( @ It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.
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Conclusion
2 j! {+ a) \" i4 Q. u We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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