市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。
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8 _+ C9 g4 b( k* cMarket Commentary
Eric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
Signature Global Advisors
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4 N! V# T" Z3 M& ?' |' }2 U/ \Background remarks
 Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
as much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
 Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
  i8 c( R/ a6 p! W# Aadjustments.
; w" M* g$ q) Z5 O2 p" F* i' s) b$ l This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
safety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
7 e' Q7 v4 \6 x& h  B6 g3 |; z0 d Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
lessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
- @, I; q$ X! j. K& o We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
adjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
7 @# i% l" w+ z# w6 Z4 u8 vquantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
/ Z0 f3 i1 k3 O: O Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
% w; U6 r& g% R6 n Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
# i, `7 ]$ e$ {  k0 Greduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
" P( P5 Z/ x; _# Q) | The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
5 s0 I5 Z+ b1 l, [as funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
, j, I3 ~- t9 Cimpose liquidation values.
# r$ o# h% M6 D% [3 o  E% F0 }# V In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
( J$ T: Q) P- E) TAugust, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
0 i: f) y7 V' B1 U The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
scrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.

A look at credit markets
 Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
 High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
; H: R. q0 `- N0 z2 U) I9 E3 a! vthen, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
3 d( g' y8 q/ m2 f' Gbillion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
8 m5 C  r- ^% ?- {positive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
 Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
' S* M( K6 w9 U" z- O( @3 D; |finding financing.
( O5 O: |4 }8 G# U, ^. k# D Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
/ S- e6 t/ B  y1 e5 W5 nwere subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
2 @: }/ b2 ]* K! b3 [/ Y. R Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
is now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
going up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
# r" U/ X/ o; t) Pbankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
 European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
5 c7 v# B! A) @' ztoday.
" }2 M0 ]+ D; q" b Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
6 e- z; \$ m2 E% e8 a Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
6 ?# l) g* P; m6 g/ a& f6 R  Xthe Greek default.
 As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
& y5 E+ ?% E  f2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
" C. l' \- C: E2 @debt stabilization, needs government approvals.
3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
+ Y" A- H+ x2 [/ I) ?banks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.
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Beyond Greece
+ }, s( Q; k1 }7 a+ C; M2 }, z The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
! P. i: P; v8 T It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
 It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.

. R$ Z  t' E/ |4 u( [' OConclusion
 We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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