市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。
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1 J. k; r6 g* t% o3 zMarket Commentary
Eric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
# G' B8 _1 F2 IJames Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
: S: L  g: C4 {; L3 nSignature Global Advisors
+ Q0 S  s: o5 h' |0 k* A: d

Background remarks
 Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
as much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
0 b' E( l- A  g$ U% a* c Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
$ K$ d) h; \' R) ]/ H# [adjustments.
$ d) d. z- [& q! z* A7 c This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
! g7 f9 O7 N3 x) L& hsafety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
 Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
lessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
; c* F" _7 N* g We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
2 ^. U: J+ C, kadjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
3 d' W7 W& H) k" K9 M) Z& dquantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
 Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
 Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
reduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
- I9 K0 c- a+ D* _0 S* t The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
0 Y2 V0 B7 F' f$ t% z" R2 }1 Vas funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
2 ?# J( O# e7 l: {impose liquidation values.
 In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
. [( `) }* v0 ^, m7 }, AAugust, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
 The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
scrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.
4 m5 u% v0 g! i& ^8 [7 m: e
3 S+ p4 o5 d: `; }A look at credit markets
 Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
- A' ?# K- x: s. Z  M High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
. h/ n: |4 J" g5 d& h, A" v2 w. h" xthen, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
$ m' Y4 k2 Z3 fbillion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
$ q5 S) p& Z2 z+ {/ ]% S& o; g' CCCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
. @$ d3 r1 t, Cpositive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
 Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
finding financing.
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
 Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
+ [+ u5 X5 F) Y. B1 d* tis now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
7 j1 |& l1 ]' w1 ?2 Vgoing up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
' O9 K3 A, h- Rbankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
 European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
today.
6 t3 R- v! \* i* N3 n/ s Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
 Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
8 Q( e! Z  ?  W# qthe Greek default.
 As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
5 A0 o; a% X5 H! L/ b1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
. n2 ^3 t3 H5 X5 E) G8 pdebt stabilization, needs government approvals.
& Z0 t1 A" N7 n3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
6 ]( w8 ~5 l: k  M9 Rbanks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

Beyond Greece
7 _; ^! \1 a- a& [; {+ ] The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
0 s6 ^- ?5 P' G4 [6 @0 l5 g: _ It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
, X; g  ~* u' I6 l* }5 ` It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
: p1 R. z2 H# L$ T9 r" |8 RItalian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.

7 B* |5 P# n" o+ b$ WConclusion
* U2 M$ `7 J5 [  j: I We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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