市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。

( b: ~+ U  Q$ Z7 V1 U  _  AMarket Commentary
& S' x6 o4 j) @: q) [2 [$ o1 @Eric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
Signature Global Advisors
3 N* B7 @" h1 _' o6 J

4 F8 m! T5 P" `) B0 BBackground remarks
 Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
( C' Y) d1 Y' \6 |5 J5 P9 t3 nas much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
 Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
- x/ U, G3 k# F* K' k# h) eadjustments.
" ]2 m% s& N" {& b  C" w1 c+ i! @ This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
( r' L) X% y) d3 K1 Ysafety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
 Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
; M( g3 c& C) ^5 glessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
 We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
adjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
quantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
1 _8 i, ^9 Q0 w6 K( ? Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
 Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
reduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
, J4 ^- l: L9 \9 E, W' u3 K6 q0 H The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
9 Y5 U' F" a; n; Zas funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
% [; V& @: F& z: Y6 C1 v' ~; E( iimpose liquidation values.
2 H3 G/ G; {: @ In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
August, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
 The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
$ V6 |2 d$ G9 h; Vscrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.

A look at credit markets
 Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
 High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
billion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
8 [  T( t- k: e, j3 K4 ?( f2 A+ H# tpositive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
 Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
0 q3 F2 l8 k( m) y4 v( ~/ v5 e1 ~finding financing.
. x2 k( m0 P* l$ F Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
, W; _0 Q1 `. G7 ~ Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
( }5 Z( P# ]  P$ {+ f  Fis now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
0 K8 p6 ]1 [. V" k3 @going up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
bankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
( S% ~1 o4 d, } European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
today.
, j: U) i5 ~  w0 g  E; x& P: N! u Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
 Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
) C) X1 z8 ^& }8 p. Vthe Greek default.
- B/ M/ f1 H; K8 e: u As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
2 x& l0 ^' T- t" ?- K0 r/ v1 d" X. ?6 ndebt stabilization, needs government approvals.
3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
: E8 D4 l& d! M" ~( Ibanks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

1 H7 R- F) r& S2 d% j8 J# ~Beyond Greece
2 K5 s9 t3 J+ Q. a$ n% @8 e) ~% r The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
2 g' s3 m1 Y, }! V" xbut that was before Italy.
 It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
0 r5 e6 d- Z% z5 q+ J7 ?1 w It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.

Conclusion
 We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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