市场评论

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下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。

: l* H+ |3 h! }3 `1 V% h9 AMarket Commentary
& e$ u- ?( i0 m) M9 Y7 e$ Z! f$ cEric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
Signature Global Advisors
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Background remarks
5 S* R- g" n: c5 R Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
as much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
 Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
adjustments.
1 u, x2 W( _; J7 y This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
8 a$ J6 U  c0 Z$ \safety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
# {- x4 g; n, Y; W& @3 x* T1 [( p Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
lessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
/ \7 D9 u" u0 S9 P) V* m; g  A We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
adjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
: a8 N( @* ?6 r5 i Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
( V& ]& c8 f1 V( v9 ~* ~3 }# M; q7 yquantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
# w) a0 h0 e2 U8 @& G1 f Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
0 F( q9 v# W) c# Q) I Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
1 e1 A% e5 ^0 g. }7 [, Y! g$ d4 Mreduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
) a' t# ?) W9 q& i$ Y) H# h The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
as funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
3 w# {: N5 z$ c8 i/ M% Fimpose liquidation values.
 In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
August, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
 The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
scrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.
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0 L( T8 H) G5 h) S4 R2 O0 PA look at credit markets
 Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
1 |$ o9 g; P' u5 ^+ {9 w9 bSeptember. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
 High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
! \( L% G! y5 X3 U3 A/ n7 y1 Lthen, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
billion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
positive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
0 g( w' g6 O1 E0 E" u7 K. n Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
finding financing.
" d5 z2 A, a9 r Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
 Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
, L5 f5 v/ L8 Fis now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
going up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
( l& n( x0 ~4 O- n3 K$ D& sbankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
 European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
5 G  D7 z8 w0 r$ l, u4 ntoday.
 Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
 Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
0 J: e4 d) m  i3 Athe Greek default.
 As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
1 Q& U2 A' }; V: v" R0 ]7 x1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
: W5 S( Y1 R- vdebt stabilization, needs government approvals.
3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
6 K* e5 V( @) l9 j! r* h. wbanks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

Beyond Greece
* N. O# ]4 s+ \1 Y3 H8 m The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
( k7 h% B5 P9 _, T) Y- b$ Q* Ubut that was before Italy.
- L) a5 G# v9 f. H4 j# g& C9 s1 |( u It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
 It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.

Conclusion
 We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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