市场评论

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下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。
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Market Commentary
# N% n3 L5 r  Y$ REric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
! H2 ^: e& f( ^) a$ n5 ~Signature Global Advisors
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9 |; \7 ^' ^# d; D" Z2 z5 _Background remarks
+ w6 [; _0 s3 G7 j2 C+ {/ [" ] Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
  ?* ?' \4 ]9 F/ Z9 `as much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
 Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
adjustments.
 This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
safety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
; h/ i2 K2 r2 E( v Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
) D, ]  z! I& S! M1 rlessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
  @! C2 k. ^, o, G+ L We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
% H# x5 z. }7 k' Z6 a- tadjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
: \3 c1 ~# v7 f Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
quantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
 Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
 Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
reduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
, C' B  b9 k9 R) W( ] The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
7 r) r) b! \: p6 P) cas funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
( s, V% J7 ]6 Cimpose liquidation values.
 In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
4 I! U; c" T$ M9 ^1 x; z! b2 LAugust, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
 The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
scrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.

A look at credit markets
  }  [; |6 f. Z7 o Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
) u* z# C" m) z. pSeptember. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
 High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
% F" s4 O# P/ ?3 E) }then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
billion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
4 Y- l8 [, h) O/ K6 KCCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
positive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
 Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
* ^4 N1 p3 |3 {finding financing.
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
' `1 [3 t2 J# m. t Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
is now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
going up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
- ]( ]/ Y  ^9 a' Z5 d# c, u% nbankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
 European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
today.
 Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
: I8 }7 V) g* |, Wemerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
4 [. f4 S0 Q) a5 A% h/ q& v2 z Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
the Greek default.
' w8 u$ W$ G# n( N/ p3 t( N As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
" r' J  R/ h# J. x1 {1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
debt stabilization, needs government approvals.
1 E' _1 o* L) F0 b7 w' `: Z8 g, g3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
" H3 L' y5 {# g9 L. ]2 |banks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
! T8 W7 O/ r! B, _/ N1 c4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

6 |) v8 X$ j. x! ?( KBeyond Greece
5 O4 `" f1 g/ k! _& l% f, b The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
9 w3 N) l. y( J8 }& ]& N2 z2 s It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
 It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.

, o3 I3 Y  L0 a% G2 M! wConclusion
. h( a) S' `% ~" c! I4 Q We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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