市场评论

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下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。

Market Commentary
8 Z: s9 Q$ J: D" pEric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
, W! ?; [0 }+ `) n; E6 A5 yJames Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
  h0 c/ k* j* j, F, m9 ^Signature Global Advisors

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Background remarks
: n1 g- g1 w+ ^8 ] Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
$ u3 C# \& e" g$ F4 Bas much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
' ~3 ], c: c9 ^4 E Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
adjustments.
 This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
( v7 p1 a5 ]7 _safety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
 Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
* `: l: o' D1 S, ^# k7 @3 llessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
$ _! [- u. w- t& B We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
adjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
# x8 d  }8 ?; F. S# r Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
0 X# ?$ L) x+ j+ h& g( ?quantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
" u8 }$ l* F" P0 x Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
 Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
reduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
% Q9 r1 j5 d, u3 ~ The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
: g2 g/ e/ b# {* F7 Oas funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
impose liquidation values.
+ D3 C- P7 G) y. c/ D In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
August, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
 The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
scrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.

A look at credit markets
 Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
: {6 F1 {4 A* J1 @4 o# c, ~. {& r# H High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
billion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
) H, H, P4 |$ r3 F! }access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
positive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
 Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
/ g6 P4 P+ o) \2 y6 Ofinding financing.
7 v. K, ^2 k+ M, M Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
3 b+ D5 D& @! Z, Q; xwere subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
 Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
$ b( W  a3 w# w5 ]; Kis now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
. K- w1 S9 o: Z1 Ggoing up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
0 r: B8 t! @- [, Ebankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
 European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
& |( H, R3 {; m; @, _7 Rtoday.
' m( f, s6 `) a; K6 [ Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
 Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
4 g3 h$ z; I- g' y. C3 n0 nthe Greek default.
  D& d" P; z+ z' N! Q As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
* f( G, f5 f$ b2 s0 ?2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
% D5 _- g# J; Y1 L9 X7 odebt stabilization, needs government approvals.
3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
banks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

Beyond Greece
 The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
  ~0 [3 Z3 @0 _' `, d It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
 It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
* i5 E9 g, W& Z1 p( c: IItalian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.
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Conclusion
2 H/ I, N4 T. g3 \& ~; J We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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