市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。
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Market Commentary
) N2 S& ]3 a' }: P/ i) h" X' UEric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
9 }% a) X' {3 bJames Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
Signature Global Advisors

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Background remarks
 Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
as much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
 Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
8 u6 m5 b! ?- {& O$ dadjustments.
 This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
safety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
 Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
# X( @4 ?+ g/ `lessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
+ K+ @2 s$ V" `% L' I1 ` We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
" ]" k# q; F3 @/ k; eadjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
7 j/ X# @5 \( |& s1 M( q/ l) oquantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
 Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
+ H  E- P% A& O0 H" z' | Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
) u& _& a, Q0 f) P4 n% ], Wreduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
) z8 P  V6 L2 Y1 l4 u8 D+ ^ The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
, E+ c& s. m$ T# D0 Oas funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
8 Y6 G+ J+ v1 y6 |$ Z) qimpose liquidation values.
; Z& i9 o( W+ U. ? In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
August, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
. K7 G1 L9 G7 Z1 O The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
scrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.

" {& ?5 D3 ^* Q7 ?A look at credit markets
 Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
 High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
, P! Z! g0 @5 D1 w% m1 R) Jthen, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
billion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
7 A9 t% d% W4 S6 bCCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
6 Z+ v- |. z% V+ x; mpositive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
/ e1 F  ^5 P/ P* K+ L Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
finding financing.
! g9 `: O) m. y$ {* A( e- a( T0 V Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
0 i3 `+ R' h0 K+ a, W, {9 h Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
is now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
- H. v! g% w5 `: f& F$ egoing up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
bankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
! L  R3 X+ y% h0 ]# ]/ {5 T European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
today.
 Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
' J: E  i" E$ p# ]# O. q4 Femerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
* }$ X' Y9 D; p1 w) n Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
* |/ J# E( ~4 t5 [the Greek default.
 As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
/ K% ]1 a* t& M1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
8 S+ b% {8 R1 {+ ]/ e$ y$ k! [6 t5 zdebt stabilization, needs government approvals.
3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
banks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.
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Beyond Greece
+ F: j8 t7 A! y* n( W7 o1 z0 U The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
& C, V+ r  l9 obut that was before Italy.
 It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
3 f9 e6 r: a" J9 S It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
7 P) w2 `5 b4 T  J% e$ u2 v% MItalian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.
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Conclusion
 We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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