市场评论

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下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。
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% b7 ~7 M" D% x; i! C$ ?Market Commentary
% i0 {2 p) _/ sEric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
Signature Global Advisors
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. ]# k! N$ i% D7 \2 G6 tBackground remarks
, v9 w) m6 Q' Y; s& B9 d Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
- l5 u4 W9 a" b3 K# Nas much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
 Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
/ s; A+ @6 Q. D3 W5 R5 nadjustments.
" Z# u/ a8 X) J  p* t2 I- @& { This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
" A; P9 g5 h, |; \' Z# Jsafety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
 Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
lessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
, {! e% s  K6 E4 S& j: o  ^ We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
adjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
quantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
 Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
; C/ U" P7 @& A: i Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
reduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
/ Z% N. _3 g/ X+ E5 G) L0 `0 v The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
* O6 u# B5 Y( e; N+ q) jas funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
impose liquidation values.
 In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
August, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
 The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
scrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.

A look at credit markets
. H8 R5 Q4 L7 H Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
* n# u8 S; G4 c9 f. f7 q) rSeptember. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
 High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
) p- J1 u$ z  Y7 a4 Dthen, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
billion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
7 I2 p$ W4 r, T, xaccess to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
0 o' r+ o( @2 Ypositive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
 Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
finding financing.
3 a4 f" y# C3 }' X- b; Y. R Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
 Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
is now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
( o! n+ z; b  t! ~  l+ _+ |going up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
bankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
 European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
% R5 l% V% Q' ^- m" Vtoday.
 Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
$ W* g3 s0 Z! g# e* |emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
 Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
the Greek default.
 As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
0 n+ `& m. q  {1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
% `7 V* {/ _7 B  \' N% F7 P; edebt stabilization, needs government approvals.
3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
; A6 H. z& j. n3 \) W0 Hbanks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.
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Beyond Greece
" ?4 N  P8 m- g The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
* a% [  ]" F. |( C: Lbut that was before Italy.
 It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
 It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.
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Conclusion
 We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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