市场评论

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下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。

Market Commentary
Eric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
$ x4 H' y8 L4 T/ wJames Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
Signature Global Advisors

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  h! G+ X" ]" N; j0 [1 ?* pBackground remarks
 Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
as much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
 Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
adjustments.
+ I  V* g; u% m% W7 h/ V) N4 t This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
safety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
' W' R$ M8 o/ ]" j/ m Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
lessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
 We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
adjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
; d7 v! F9 d. r- Z8 L7 Qquantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
6 \" B6 j- n5 v! |# _0 x! v2 e Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
 Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
' }! y6 G) z5 t8 F0 B7 v1 ^reduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
6 H3 z3 b2 [! w* ?) d5 e: V' v The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
as funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
# M2 \! l: a: @7 [5 p0 Limpose liquidation values.
 In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
August, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
; q6 V: Q) M. Q5 Z- J3 q1 t- D The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
scrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.

A look at credit markets
 Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
* G; I5 N  b  l4 c- d High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
billion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
. j% x, m, P) E+ jCCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
3 \) Z. V7 e$ y3 o: R. Rpositive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
0 u) ~8 u- }6 |2 q" U$ i Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
; P( K# j# {, w" d; ?finding financing.
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
 Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
" c  d% t( d  B) Z1 ^% F6 i# Cis now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
going up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
# h7 l" M2 w! K+ hbankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
  C. k. @: y, ~ European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
today.
: _. M& H4 ]# K# d' l( `6 t Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
 Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
3 r# C8 k$ u- G0 Z5 J6 ^0 m2 Hthe Greek default.
 As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
" y  P6 T% N& M5 b( @4 G" Sdebt stabilization, needs government approvals.
' g$ P  [+ P0 y7 h! d0 s& Y( z3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
( Z; k' ]& l) Ibanks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
3 l5 ~7 p' L8 _1 N4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.
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Beyond Greece
% R. L( Q% T& v; {% Z7 [8 g The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
% U5 {4 `) k+ _1 l3 O: u- a/ G& @5 O It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
 It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.

Conclusion
 We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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