市场评论

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下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。
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" A) u) b6 z& M& R/ d* k! j- e" f0 HMarket Commentary
Eric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
0 r4 i6 S0 H1 l2 Z& Y3 v9 ?, o/ cJames Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
Signature Global Advisors


) {2 \, w/ z& p- l5 q  L2 {- JBackground remarks
$ d) L1 s! A/ i( z. ^$ F( I7 m Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
as much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
8 ]; p; B- n7 d Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
/ g; k' e$ k. C6 C4 }# L( `adjustments.
 This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
safety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
 Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
lessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
 We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
adjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
% z: T% \! \2 Z! Y9 w: ^; }, equantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
 Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
. d5 L% {! n; C6 ]; o' _5 d Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
( l2 ]  }0 f" w0 j* Nreduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
0 R: i  H0 B5 ~$ M$ Y The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
8 U) s& d# g+ Y& _+ g( D& s- Cas funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
impose liquidation values.
 In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
2 t% H! D# T8 kAugust, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
 The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
scrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.
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A look at credit markets
 Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
' E$ `, Z9 X+ P  J0 T High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
billion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
: m# a% e1 |0 O' R5 p4 @access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
6 w( G" R3 h* l+ Xpositive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
2 R& D) Q' _6 ^7 S" ]' R: Y* H  k Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
" p# y+ K8 R  w: e( |/ Ifinding financing.
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
7 w$ G% E1 `3 D Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
: @! Q4 m: r7 b' q0 nis now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
going up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
# @' N5 F6 V- }; P* S. e% {bankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
6 v0 G$ N, J- `# i' ~, B1 i European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
9 b$ I6 O; _5 d: L, atoday.
. v3 `: h- k2 e$ W1 \ Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
/ p7 _% P0 s% Q: Cemerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
 Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
the Greek default.
3 R, K: K1 J! \- }- I! I: ^9 W2 P As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
, `* R* g. Y8 u& a# Q; B1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
: q1 V; a$ F( x- @) \2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
% K  Y0 g! x7 G" E* o+ t" jdebt stabilization, needs government approvals.
3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
banks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
  E3 S9 c3 V: y. H1 d9 c4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

0 S! W# K; O3 ?( }/ S7 z' X9 cBeyond Greece
 The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
$ k5 q( B, m/ C! pbut that was before Italy.
, P7 I. `: ]; ` It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
 It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.
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Conclusion
8 d3 t( B9 I  B% _ We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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