市场评论

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下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。
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, A  H1 O  \6 k3 OMarket Commentary
1 D  t* a/ `* }; `9 i0 CEric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
, D' C. x+ _! a: ~, z+ QSignature Global Advisors
& }$ H) ?; O) o. r  P2 {& A

Background remarks
) p9 M! C( S; U9 f3 v3 q7 X: g Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
as much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
 Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
0 y4 ^9 z8 s- V5 u5 ?adjustments.
: l9 v4 Q$ x" d This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
+ T. n( B% X0 ~% z  M& _/ Ysafety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
 Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
1 N% ?, a% e5 C) M0 ^2 Wlessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
, x0 A4 }# L( F9 H" Z/ h We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
adjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
quantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
5 a) a& ^+ l5 _2 N' p Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
5 V3 S3 G6 m+ G Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
* a: R* l' S/ X+ dreduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
2 W5 ?0 {( V: _% q4 H: h# M The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
% w) a" u! g$ S9 b  D! n7 @as funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
impose liquidation values.
 In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
# W1 D5 Q* d" `* l" v% EAugust, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
# `6 o1 N9 W/ Z9 |2 k: A  N0 v The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
scrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.

A look at credit markets
  O0 g3 e# p4 W- F( ?0 t Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
/ L7 L0 X  m4 L. J1 ~8 PSeptember. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
 High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
4 j$ t. J* _. i, ]3 J- Wthen, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
' U! t) ^1 y1 k+ |. p: D8 o( Q& j8 Z( @billion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
! L/ ~, `$ d: ]5 G; n0 ^access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
! Y5 q2 t$ A% x4 g# X% \; ~1 ECCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
positive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
2 D$ ~9 q4 G8 s6 Y! F7 t Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
finding financing.
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
: N. T% x* f% L; m5 d- K! Mwere subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
* s( R2 Z& k5 z+ \# X6 q Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
6 |7 h. h- M+ b: his now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
going up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
! y+ z& ~) o5 W& n! cbankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
 European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
. h: C: J4 S. y1 ?8 @0 f+ ptoday.
 Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
; p- H0 R, G8 |4 Vemerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
7 T: z) e* ~  L1 K7 g) s) u Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
  X2 s9 s/ h; h! ]$ v2 g1 xthe Greek default.
 As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
$ Y" G; s) _0 W0 V. i$ r' V. edebt stabilization, needs government approvals.
3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
5 G7 V/ w9 Y0 N  Wbanks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

Beyond Greece
3 p5 J5 L# R" v* V7 w The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
4 J% R, N* h: ~5 O5 Z, N5 A/ ]1 R It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
 It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.

Conclusion
 We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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