市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。

Market Commentary
' G: j  Q# Z" u( ?Eric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
, G/ @; p6 G8 E) V2 S; }, i- r$ A# A6 @James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
& R3 c) {1 |' n- @Signature Global Advisors

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Background remarks
 Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
as much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
  T9 L$ v7 m  f- H0 a Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
& E' A7 N# N8 q/ O  ?+ o  |adjustments.
 This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
safety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
3 h7 q' h  P  L Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
8 A: a0 e' `% G% \& q% llessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
 We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
adjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
$ i( d7 f2 g. I5 I" `- m9 f) m" b Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
- ^0 {' U$ V% _4 k) rquantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
 Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
2 u/ E% K: ]5 c7 I- ~, c Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
( F  t3 C  v5 Kreduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
/ z. ]0 S  U" p% E The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
  X" \6 T& [/ bas funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
) J* Z; g* M& e7 |/ C- iimpose liquidation values.
 In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
August, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
 The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
scrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.
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. w, e6 o1 r( Q$ }A look at credit markets
 Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
! y) I6 i6 K  D$ J; | High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
2 }, _. R/ B; j) U( M, Bbillion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
( h% F2 X$ L7 ]& ~access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
/ `. s1 \" s) _3 M" n# f# _CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
positive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
( D! o0 }0 u4 d& l. Z Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
finding financing.
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
3 P' V6 P7 n+ t3 Lwere subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
 Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
is now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
% Q+ A: Z( e6 x0 h" V, t2 Ggoing up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
bankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
 European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
today.
+ v! D& q* F1 c( k, ]! C9 R. V Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
3 l/ A; r. i  qemerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
 Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
the Greek default.
( Y$ p: J3 i% ^2 j. e2 _3 r* ?8 n As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
- V8 {& V  @7 o' U1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
  r6 \" `4 P& x/ H) g+ G# Jdebt stabilization, needs government approvals.
7 W$ |" Z9 d: W  d8 W; E& {3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
7 ~( C7 T, Z# rbanks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
1 I) H, X. @! C0 K4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

Beyond Greece
) {: m# T8 W  n) t& U The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
* e: f9 E: C! b* Zbut that was before Italy.
 It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
1 H3 R( S6 Z8 G# O8 p It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.
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# m4 V/ _( `* KConclusion
! u* M: n1 i. F1 ` We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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