市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。

) e' B* R& c. [" s: O: A( @Market Commentary
Eric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
Signature Global Advisors
, Y! Y$ A4 x* Z% p6 X- `2 b0 `
3 H% m( D/ ]7 M% F
Background remarks
4 {: b5 G3 d/ V" q8 S Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
as much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
  R- t0 i2 f2 H Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
* z* @7 e9 V' L# h/ O0 m, Gadjustments.
5 i3 d1 C- q4 V( y! E3 ] This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
" z) ^6 P! G! S: v! Dsafety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
 Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
8 w3 ?" M0 l/ B( }0 ulessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
 We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
adjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
" ~1 `$ }: z/ P* ?' n, j3 dquantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
 Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
$ I% T) ^5 j2 E Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
reduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

小曲

Current situation
 The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
4 r. R; r+ ~% n+ k& _. }6 p: kas funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
impose liquidation values.
5 B5 b0 ~  L2 Z! }$ G, w7 S7 T6 g In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
# e% f  Q  O/ {7 g4 K/ x" D' |- XAugust, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
 The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
scrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.
; R5 P$ @0 |& L
A look at credit markets
 Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
) I/ y, `4 n1 G, ~$ q7 j" Z High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
5 {2 Z$ I$ }0 v) E# H, F* t% Lthen, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
billion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
4 W" x2 q' Z$ w  }3 z' @$ R& iCCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
+ [" u6 p4 i& l& G1 ?positive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
 Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
3 ~+ f2 c: D- nfinding financing.
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
 Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
# h5 q6 v2 J* R9 ?* Z; jis now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
( c3 z& r4 _' b2 b* ~9 pgoing up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
bankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
 European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
today.
 Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
, s. o6 _  }; J; W7 _$ semerging markets have no problem with funding.

小曲

European Union agenda
* U# v2 x1 `9 _% l Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
the Greek default.
) y0 H" |+ Q) y' I% g As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
# l  i3 ?( A: U5 P) s' Q6 t, A, S; l- o1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
* F0 M' f" t  Q1 {6 v% {3 D2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
debt stabilization, needs government approvals.
7 z6 H* i) E7 U, l9 b! d3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
( p( {  p' N  c; Y! n  f8 R7 }banks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

4 x  q9 t! {4 vBeyond Greece
2 d5 i  }+ _; v! ~ The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
" K, q0 {# P  E9 p/ Gbut that was before Italy.
 It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
- v' B1 R, J$ N6 g7 f/ b4 j It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.
" I9 ~5 c. j' Q5 f$ D
Conclusion
 We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

yuz967

kasnkan